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PHILOSOPHICAL PARTIES AND THEIR SIG-
NIFICANCE AS FACTORS IN THE
EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT.
BY THE EDITOR.
THERE IS a natural contrast in philosophy between rationalists
and empiricists, between the theory-party and the fact-party,
between deductionists and inductionists, between the advocates of
pure reason and the advocates of experience, between the believ-
ers in the universal and the sticklers for particulars, and these par-
ties are as natural in philosophy as the Whigs and Tories, the Re-
publicans and Democrats in politics, the anarchists and socialists
in social affairs, and the Pharisees and Sadducees in religion. Both
parties work in harmony toward a common aim, which is the discov-
ery of truth, representing two principles, the former looking out for
the unity of all things, the latter for exactness in detail. Both par-
ties are needed in philosophy as much as we need in politics the
Republicans for union, order, centralisation, and the Democrats
for independence, liberty, and non-interference in local and private
affairs.^ The Tories are the English Republicans and the Whigs
the English Democrats. The socialists are social Tories, or the
party of social organisation and union ; the anarchists are the so-
cial Whigs, the party of liberty and independence. Thus the theo-
rists in philosophy, the advocates of pure reason, are the Tories
of thought and the particularists or advocates of pure experience
are the Whigs of thought.
The same holds good in religion, where the Pharisees insist on
definiteness in dogma and on authority in church government,
IThis general characterisation of our parties refers merely to the traditional principles, leav-
ing out of sight the fact that the silverites have of late taken possession of the Democratic party-
machine and switched it off on the side-track of populism.
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while the Sadducees demand culture, even though it may come from
the Gentiles, and freedom from dogma.
In addition to these two parties there is another party which
in American politics has received the name of Populist, and in Ger-
many the collective name of the die Wilden, the wild ones, or sav-
ages. They are the irregulars who follow either no principle what-
ever or raise some side issue, thus giving a universal significance
to some unimportant question. They are innovators on general
principles ; they propose a change on account of their dissatisfac-
tion with the world. As a rule they rise from the ranks of those
who not having the public ear try to gain it by creating a sensation
of some kind. They are in this respect very much like those per-
sonages in politics who are hopelessly out of power and anxious to
come into power by any means, just criticism of existing evils and
otherwise—mostly otherwise. But whether or not their complaints
are right or wrong, they are generally disregarded and poohpoohed.
The Populists in politics and the irregulars in philosophy play
a very important part in history. They represent the spirit that
denies, and when by a division of power both parties have become
corrupt and anti-progressive, the irregulars grow in prominence
and shake them from their stupor. Some of the greatest move-
ments have been launched by this party of wild issues \ but we
must add that a wild issue raised on account of some sore need
that was neglected by the Pharisees and Sadducees of the time,
always sobers down when it grows to power. The Nazarene move-
ment of Palestine is a religious populism which culminated in
Christ's preaching the Gospel to the poor, leading finally to the
establishment of the Christian Church, in which to-day we have
the same division of parties, the dogmatists, or so-called orthodox,
and the liberals, both being nothing but a reincarnation of the
Pharisees and Sadducees of the times of Christ.
The Pharisees and Sadducees are as severely and indiscrimi-
nately arraigned in the New Testament as are the Republicans and
Democrats by the Populists of to-day ; and this lack of discrimina-
tion is natural. Both parties had remained heedless of the reli-
gious demands of the large classes of the poor and the uncultured.
Both looked down with contempt upon the irregular preachers and
self-appointed prophets of the Essenes and Nazarenes, who (like
John the Baptist) lived, in food and dress, like Buddhist monks,
introduced new rites, such as baptism, preached in the streets,
and represented in this way the voice crying in the wilderness.
We know from Josephus that both the Pharisees and the Saddu-
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cees were by no means such contemptible persons as they are com-
monly supposed to have been. With all their faults, they were,
taken as a class, earnest and upright men who tried to do what
was right according to their best knowledge and obeying the dic-
tates of their conscience. The Pharisees were stern in their faith
in Jehovah and adhered with strictness to the covenant ; and the
Sadducees, seeing the narrowness of traditional Judaism, endeav-
ored to broaden the religion of their fathers. We may assume
that there were hypocrites among them, but the Pharisees' hopes
and the Sadducees' aspirations were as honest as was any religious
faith in the world. Their main fault was narrowness, not rascality
and blindness, not knavery and ignorance, not ill-will. Considering
the tragic fate of the people of Israel, we feel compassion for them,
we pity them, but cannot look upon them as rogues. And what
holds good of the old Pharisees and Sadducees is true of the mod-
ern Pharisees and Sadducees. There are hypocrites among them,
but for that reason we need not call them a generation of vipers.
The Populists form a third party, but it would be wrong to
imagine that the irregulars, the innovators, the representatives of
prevalent dissatisfaction, are all that is left. There is not only
the large mass of indifferent people who allow themselves to drift
with the currents that originate in the conflict of both parties, fol-
lowing upon the whole either the will o' the wisps of private hopes
or yielding thoughtlessly to their sentiments, which are allured by
catching party-cries. There are also a number of independent men
who would not swear by any one party-principle, and who some-
times do not care for consistency of party-principles, but would
leave such questions alone and select what for some reason or
other they feel there is a moral need of. They are called in poli-
tics the independents, in philosophy eclectics.
Independents and eclectics rise frequently into great promi-
nence in times of need. They recruit themselves from the middle
classes, who for practical ends and for the sake of peace, demand
a status Vivendi which would temporarily settle a problem by com-
promise. The independents appear on the scene of local govern-
ment as "citizens' parties" and under similar names. Their work,
however, is sporadic. They make a clean sweep, but as soon as
the pressing cause of indignation that called the movement into
existence has been removed, the enthusiasm abates on account of
the general indifference, and the citizens' party changes into a reg-
ular political machine with spoils' system and all other faults. The
eclectics in philosophy are similar ; they are the seeds of thought
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that grow on stony places ; forthwith they spring up because they
have no depth of soil; but when the sun rises they are scorched,
and because they have not root, they wither away."
There is a great difference between the independents, the ec-
lectics or citizens' party, and the Populists or irregulars. The for-
mer are practical and demand the settlement of practical questions.
If they enter into matters of principle they are fain to appeal to
two or more contradictory principles in one breath. They have no
root, and are lacking in depth. The latter, however, are, upon
the whole, wild theorisers ; they sometimes fight principles as a
matter of principle. They endeavor in their way to be thorough,
but their schemes are wild and their theories crude.
The Populists can start new movements, but they are forever
unable to run them. As soon as a new movement has become an
established fact, the two parties of universalists or unionists and
the particularists will under new names naturally and spontaneously
reappear. The old names become sometimes odious and are for
that reason dropped, but the new party divisions will in all essen-
tials be on the lines of the old principles.
The reason of the constant reappearance of the same contrasts
lies in the fact that they are both legitimate. They are contrasts
but not contradictions. Both principles are rignt, and the history
of the world is mankind's endeavor to adjust itself to both. Zealous
partisans would abolish either principle and expect the realisation
of a millennium on earth as soon as the principle which they have
happened to embrace will have sole sway. Thus the ideals of both
anarchism and socialism will be actualised in every social progress,
not in the way that demagogues preach, but as society develops,
according to the laws of social growth. Every new adjustment of
the needs of society, every new institution in which it takes shape,
will create better chances for individuals to make a fair living and
through a choice of new possibilitif.s widen their sphere of inde-
pendence. Every definite comprehension of the true significance
of a religious doctrine will show the old dogmas in a new light,
—
not, to be sure, in the light of narrow traditionalism, but after all
as a fulfilment of the ideal which the dogmatists were groping
after.
In the history of modern philosophy it is sometimes difficult
to class philosophers, because they do not go to the polls to vote
either way on party issues, and cannot therefore be divided as the
goats and the sheep will be on the day of judgment. As there are
no republicans who would not occasionally advocate democratic
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measures, and vice versa, so there are no theorists who do not
gladly avail themselves of the material of the empiricists; and
there is no one who as a matter of principle rests his confidence
on experience alone, who would not form a theory as soon as he
believes he has found the general feature in a number of single
facts. Nevertheless, we can say generally that among modern
thinkers Kant, the philosopher of Pure Reason, represents the de-
ductionist, the theorist, the believer in universality, the upholder
of the a priori; John Stuart Mill, the advocate of pure experience,
the inductionist, the believer in particulars, the upholder of the
a posteriori as the sole source of knowledge; and Herbert Spencer,
the eclectic. Without solving any one of the fundamental prin-
ciples, Spencer accepts the main results of the science of his day
and thus satisfies that large class of people who are in search of a
solution that will serve their most urgent philosophical needs. As
a typical populist in philosophy, one of the irregulars, who pro-
poses to be original by principle, is Nietszche, rampant and inco-
herent, but interesting; betraying even in his clearest works the
incipient insanity to which he finally fell a prey, but suggestive
;
ridiculously grandiloquent, but ingenious, and brilliant.
The constant reappearance of the two main parties in philos-
ophy, as indicated by Plato and Aristotle, the realists and the nom-
inalists, the Kantians and the experience-philosophers, has led
to the belief that the issue between these opposed principles is
ultimately based upon the idiosyncrasy of the philosopher and can
therefore never be decided but must forever remain a matter of
personal preference. We beg to differ. As society is the product
of two factors, the needs of the whole community and the wants of
the individual, so the scientific instinct seeks a comprehension of
the unity that pervades all the particulars and collects the particu-
lars for the purpose of gathering them up into unities. If the real-
ists imagine that the unities in nature, the types or ideas, the no-
umena, exist as independent entities or essences within, above,
and beyond the things in which they have become incarnate, they
are mistaken; and if the nominalists imagine that they are purely
subjective notions to which there is no correspondent reality in the
objective world, they, too, are mistaken. The types of being are
not metaphysical essences but pure forms, and being pure forms
they are, although not material, yet real or actual.
The issue between both parties can be decided only by a clear
and definite conception of the nature of form. The form of a
statue and the form of musical sounds consist neither of matter nor
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of motion; and yet the forms of things are their most essential
qualities. Things are such as they are because they possess certain
forms. Form is the essential problem everywhere We have rea-
sons to believe that even the chemical elements are different
groupings of the same world-substance, and that thus their differ-
rence will eventually be explicable as a difference of form.
All science is ultimately a tracing of form ; hence the para-
mount importance of counting and measuring in all exact investi-
gations. But we must remember that counting and measuring are
only quantitative determinations of form, and that qualitative dif-
ferences must be defined by subtler methods of purely formal
thought.
The philosophy of form is the philosophy of science; it starts
from experience, systematises the facts of experience, and then
studies the method of sytematisation which contains the key to the
order that prevails throughout the cosmos. The system that char-
acterises the functions of all the purely formal sciences (which as
a totality characteristic of the human mind is called Reason) is an-
alogous to the formal aspect of the objective world; or, in other
words, the intrinsic harmony of mathematical constructions and
the immanent order of the laws of nature (which at first sight ap-
pear to us as the studied design of a creator) are the results of
the same conditions in different fields : they are products of the
same determinedness of formal laws, implying intrinsic necessity
as well as universality.
Now, we claim that while forms are not gods, nor metaphysi-
cal essences, nor entities of any kind, that they are nevertheless
(as the realists claim) not only present in the things, but exist also
independently of them as "pure forms." There are no things in
themselves, but there are "forms in themselves." This is the solu-
tion of the old quarrel between the mediaeval schools of reahsm and
nominalism, and this is also the answer which we present to the
fundamental questions of Kant's transcendentalism. It is wrong
to seek for an x behind the things; that which constitutes the
thing is its form ; and if a concrete thing is destroyed it can be
reconstructed by an exact restitution of its form.
There is one important peculiarity of form, viz., the intrinsic
necessity of its laws. This, reduced to its simplest expression, is
formulated as the law of identity, which declares that that same is
the same. The same purely formal operation will give the same
results wherever, whenever, and howsoever it may be done. One
plus one equals two, whether counted in apples or planets, or any
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imaginary objects, and (a-)- ^)2= fl!' + 2«^ + <^-, whatever a and (^
may stand for.
The sciences of pure form are not (as the nominalists claim)
purely subjective inventions ; they are not mere conceits of the
mind ; they possess objective validity. The fundamental notions
of form are abstractions from experience, and in this sense they
Z.XG. a posteriori, but given the fundamental notions of pure form
every thinking being can, a priori, construct forms which, if they
are consistently built up, will generally be applicable to objective
reality, for the same process will lead to the same results whether
performed with purely mental figures or with concrete objects of
any kind. The applicability of mathematics to the most distant
stars on which we can never set foot demolishes the principle of
nominalism that we know particulars only and have no right to
formulate any universal law until we have collected all its single
instances in actual experience.
Both the nominalists and the realists were right in their main
aspirations. There is (as the realists claim) a unity in the world,
and this unity is a real presence in the universe. On the other
hand, the nominalists are right in saying that the world consists of
particulars and there is no other way to a comprehension of the
world than by a study of these particulars. Universals are first
mere names, the verification of which as actualities in the objective
world can only be determined by a verification of their applicable-
ness to the concrete world of particulars.
The world of form, being throughout definite and determined,
is a world of order. It is the condition of science and the condi-
tion of ethics. Science is everywhere the tracing of some change of
form ; and its principle is negatively expressed in the physicist's
law of the conservation of matter and energy, and positively in the
law of causation. Both laws declare that in all changes there is
a certain something which remains the same. Qualitative changes
involve no quantitative changes ; which means that all causation
is ultimately a transformation, a new arrangement, a new distri-
bution of parts.
The philosophy of form is not a temporary compromise be-
tween realism and nominalism, between Kantian apriorism and
John Stuart Mill's empiricism, but a definite settlement of its
issues.^ It neither overlooks nor abolishes the contrasts that nat-
IFor further details as to the nature of cognition, reason, the a priori in its relation to the
a posteriori and further inferences in the domains of reJigion and ethics, see the writer's Primer
of Philosophy.
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urally obtain between them, but on the contrary justifies the prin-
ciples on which they are based and hmits them to their proper
spheres. Thus the faults of onesidedness can be avoided and sci-
ence has come in close touch with philosophy.
The philosophy of form is a new positivism in so far as it de-
rives the fundamental notions of forms from the positive facts of
experience; it is a new monism in so far as the formal aspect of
the world constitutes its unity and verifies the assumption of the
oneness of all existence as well as the unison of all truth. It is the
philosophy of science in so far as it analyses and explains the
methods of science ; it can serve as a propaedeutic to scientific
methodology and justifies the scientist's ideal, which assumes that
truth is attainable.
